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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of CEOs’ external social connections
with other executives and directors on classification shifting, a
widespread malpractice that inflates core earnings by altering the
presentation of income statement line items without affecting
bottom-line income. Using a sample of 995 UK listed firms in the
period 2005 to 2016 and relying on the assumptions of social
capital theory and the rent-extraction perspective, we find that
CEOs with a larger number of external connections are more
likely to engage in classification shifting. Further results indicate
that this phenomenon occurs particularly when well-connected
CEOs are local and/or are in the early years of their service.
Collectively, the results suggest that social connections promote
corporate malpractices that are unlikely to cause reputational
losses. Overall, we contribute to the literature by providing
evidence that the social capital of the CEO is an important driver
of classification shifting.
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Classification shifting is the practice of misclassifying core expenses as income-decreas-
ing special items within the income statement. The result of this misclassification is an
increase in core earnings with no effect on net income. Classification shifting research
has attracted growing interest since the study of McVay (2006). Previous studies in
this area have examined what drives the misclassification of income statement line
items (e.g. Athanasakou et al., 2009; Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020; Fan et al., 2010; Fan
et al., 2019), considering the widespread use of this practice (e.g. Haw et al., 2011;
Zalata & Roberts, 2017). For example, they have documented that equity market incen-
tives (Athanasakou et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010), EBITDA-based debt covenants (Fan
et al., 2019), and religious social norms (Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020) affect the use of
classification shifting. Although these studies have identified several important drivers
of classification shifting, the role that CEO social connections play in classification shift-
ing is still an unexplored research question.
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Social connections play a key role in human life; they can influence human beings’
behaviour and ultimately their physical and mental well-being. Despite this, the account-
ing and finance literature has just begun to research the effects that social connections
have on corporate practices (e.g. El-Khatib et al., 2015; Engelberg et al., 2013; Goergen
et al., 2019; Renneboog & Zhao, 2011, 2014). To our knowledge, only two studies have
investigated the relationship between CEO social connections and financial reporting
quality (Bhandari et al., 2018; Griffin et al., 2021). These studies document that CEO
social connections decrease accrual earnings management (Bhandari et al., 2018) while
increasing real earnings management (Griffin et al., 2021). These contrasting findings
raise the question of whether CEO social connections increase or decrease classification
shifting, which is empirically investigated in our study.
In the context ofCEOsocial connections, both the assumptions of the optimal contacting
perspective, used by Bhandari et al. (2018) in relation to accrual earningsmanagement, and
those of the rent extraction perspective, used by Griffin et al. (2021) in relation to real earn-
ingsmanagement, can potentially explain the use of classification shifting. According to the
optimal contracting perspective, well-connected CEOs avoid the use of corporate practices
that can undermine their reputation (Francis et al., 2008). These assumptions could explain
the use of classification shifting: it is a malpractice aimed at inflating core earnings to show
them in a better light than warranted and, if detected, CEOs could suffer from reputational
losses. Furthermore, similar to accrual earningsmanagement, classification shifting is likely
to have a negative impact on future reported core earnings (Liu &Wu, 2021;McVay, 2006).
Well-connected CEOs might therefore avoid using classification shifting because it could
undermine their reputation as good performers in the following financial years.
However, different from accrual earnings management, classification shifting does not
have any impact on current/future bottom-line income, is difficult to detect, and, as such,
is unlikely to cause any reputational harm (Alfonso et al., 2015; Athanasakou et al., 2009;
McVay, 2006). Thus, the pre-emptive effect of social connections on the use of corporate
malpractices could be limited in relation to classification shifting.
The assumptions of the rent-extraction perspective could also explain the use of classifi-
cation shifting. According to this perspective, well-connected CEOs tend to use more earn-
ingsmanagement as they are visible actors under great pressure tomeetmarket expectations
and undermining these expectations could harm their reputation (Francis et al., 2008; Mal-
mendier & Tate, 2009). Classification shifting could therefore be appealing for well-con-
nected CEOs to employ as, similar to real earnings management, it is difficult to detect
and thereby helps them to meet market expectations with limited reputational harm.
However, different from real earnings management, classification shifting is likely to be
negatively associated with the subsequent period’s operating performance (Gunny, 2010;
Jiang et al., 2018; Liu & Wu, 2021; McVay, 2006). Since well-connected CEOs are subject
to expectations to achieve good performance not only in the current period but also in
the subsequent periods (Malmendier & Tate, 2009), the incentive to inflate earnings via
classification shiftingmight be limited forwell-connectedCEOs.Our empirical examination
is therefore important as, ex-ante, there are no clear predictions on the association between
classification shifting and CEO social connections. This is because classification shifting has
peculiar characteristics that make it a unique form of earnings management. Thus, the
results of other studies on the association between accruals/real earnings management
and social connections do not readily apply to the use of classification shifting.
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Our empirical analysis measures CEO social connections as the number of the CEO’s
external connections with other executives and board members following Bhandari et al.
(2018), Engelberg et al. (2013), and Griffin et al. (2021). Classification shifting is defined
using the methodology developed by McVay (2006). Using a sample of 995 UK public
firms listed in the period 2005–2016 and a total number of 5,391 firm-year observations,
our results show that firms with well-connected CEOs are associated with higher levels of
classification shifting, in line with the assumptions of the rent-extraction perspective. Inter-
estingly, our findings also show that well-connectedCEOs aremore likely to employ classifi-
cation shifting when they are local and/or in the early years of their service as CEOs. All the
results hold when we conduct additional analyses considering only firms where CEOs are
striving to meet earnings targets and thus have incentives to employ classification shifting,
and when we attempt to address potential endogeneity issues.
Overall, ourfindings are important aswe identifyCEO social connections as a key factor
affecting the use of classification shifting. Providing evidence on what drives classification
shifting is important as this widespread malpractice misleads investors and lenders about
the core performance of the firm by altering the presentation of different elements within
the income statement (e.g. Fan et al., 2019; Haw et al., 2011; Liu &Wu, 2021). As empha-
sised by the US Security Exchange Commission (SEC) “the appropriate classification of
amounts within the income statement is as important as the appropriate measurement
or recognition of such amounts” (SEC, 2000). In this sense, our results are interesting as
they suggest that capital providers need to have an awareness of the possibility of the
CEO using expense misclassification when he/she has a large number of social connec-
tions. Furthermore, our results help to provide a more comprehensive picture of the
effect of CEO social connections on financial reporting quality. They also reconcile the
contrasting findings of Bhandari et al. (2018) and Griffin et al. (2021) in relation to
accrual and real earnings management by considering the roles that CEO reputation
and the ability to detect corporate malpractices play in promoting/preventing the use of
corporate misreporting by well-connected CEOs. Finally, our findings add to the
broader literature on social connections, suggesting that social connections do not act
as a disciplinary mechanism when corporate malpractices are not likely to produce repu-
tational losses. Instead, they show that social connections encourage the use of these types
ofmalpractices, particularly whenCEOs have greater incentives tomanage earnings; these
include local CEOs who are more rooted in the institutional context of the social network
and CEOs in the early years of their service.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The following section discusses the
literature review and develops the hypotheses of the study. Then the research design of
the study is described, followed by the empirical results and robustness checks. Finally,
the last section discusses the main contributions of the study and outlines its conclusions.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Literature review
This study speaks to two main streams of literature: the literature on social capital that
focuses on CEO social connections and the accounting literature on classification
shifting.
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According to the literature on social capital, social connections affect the probability of
success of individuals and corporations in their respective competitive environments
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). Social connections provide individuals and corporations with
access to valuable resources, knowledge, and information that they could otherwise
not access (Uzzi, 1997). Previous research has shown that social connections help man-
agers to access information that allows them to identify innovation opportunities (Faleye
et al., 2014; Whittington et al., 2009), investment opportunities (Akbas et al., 2016;
Goergen et al., 2019), and optimal corporate governance practices (Bouwman, 2011).
Very recently, researchers have started applying the concept of social connections to
the analysis of corporate malpractices. Most of this literature has highlighted the role of
social connections as a disciplinary mechanism able to promote the adoption of positive
behaviours and prevent malpractices. Social connections improve the flow of infor-
mation, cooperation, and the exchange of knowledge among directors. They help, in
this way, to reduce information asymmetries within the boards and enable more
informed decision-making (Lin, 2001). Social connections also expose individuals to
the social norms of the social network to which they belong (Granovetter, 2005).
These norms affect individual behaviour as the social network has expectations of how
individuals should behave in respect of these norms. Infringement of these norms
exposes them to potential reputational losses arising from the detection of any misbeha-
viour (Spagnolo, 1999). However, it has also been noted that social connections do not
necessarily lead to optimal decisions (Larcker et al., 2013), and they have been found
to be associated with the use of corporate malpractices (e.g. Chiu et al., 2013; Khanna
et al., 2015). The emerging literature that has investigated the role that CEO social con-
nections play in financial reporting quality has provided supporting evidence for both
these contrasting views. On the one hand, Bhandari et al. (2018) found CEO social con-
nections to be negatively associated with accrual earnings management and financial
restatements, suggesting that well-connected CEOs demand higher financial reporting
quality. On the other hand, Griffin et al. (2021) found CEO social connections to be posi-
tively associated with real earnings management, implying that social ties reduce
financial reporting quality.
We extend the literature by examining whether CEO social capital is a driver of a mal-
practice known as classification shifting. This malpractice inflates core earnings without
changing bottom-line income by deliberately misclassifying income-statement line items.
McVay (2006) is the first to analyse the possibility of shifting items intentionally within
the income statement. By employing a US-based sample, she finds that firms shift core
expenses to income-decreasing special items. This reduces firms’ operating expenses
and so improves their core earnings, which are the main indicators for investors and ana-
lysts when analysing a company’s performance. Studies document evidence of firms
using classification shifting in various jurisdictions. Athanasakou et al. (2009) and
Zalata and Roberts (2017) find that UK firms engage in classification shifting, while
Haw et al. (2011) and Nagar and Sen (2016) show the same results for East Asian and
Indian firms, respectively. Considering the pervasive use of classification shifting,
extant research investigates the determinants of firms’ use of this form of malpractice.
Overall, this research indicates that meeting core earnings benchmarks (e.g. Athanasakou
et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010) and avoiding debt covenant violations (Fan et al., 2019)
trigger the use of classification shifting. At the same time, the religious social norms of
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the firm environment (Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020) and internal corporate governance
characteristics, such as board independence and outside directors’ tenure (Zalata &
Roberts, 2016), have been shown to mitigate the misclassification of core expenses as
income-decreasing special items.
2.2. Hypothesis development
The concept of reputation is at the core of the theory of social capital. Well-connected
CEOs are exposed to social norms and expectations about their behaviour that are
embedded in the social network to which they belong (Spagnolo, 1999). Reputational
capital is a crucial asset for well-connected CEOs. They need to preserve it to maintain
their status within their network and avoid any kind of misbehaviour that could poten-
tially damage their social capital (Lin, 2001). Given that reputation is key for well-con-
nected individuals, the optimal contracting perspective suggests that well-connected
CEOs are less likely to engage in corporate malpractices (Burt, 2005; Fama, 1980;
Francis et al., 2008). Under this perspective, it could be argued that classification shifting
is unlikely to be used by well-connected CEOs. This malpractice aims at inflating core
earnings to show them in a better light than warranted and, if detected, CEOs could
suffer from reputational losses. Furthermore, classification shifting is likely to have a
negative effect on reported core earnings in the future (Liu & Wu, 2021; McVay,
2006). This is because non-recurring items are not likely to occur every year and there-
fore the misclassification of core expenses as transitory items is unlikely to be sustained
on a continuous basis without attracting scrutiny (Anagnostopoulou et al., 2021). It is
possible that well-connected CEOs avoid employing classification shifting for these
reasons.
In contrast, from a rent-extraction perspective, it could be argued that classification
shifting is likely to be used more by well-connected CEOs as they are more visible and
under a greater market pressure to meet earnings targets and therefore are more likely
to manage earnings because underperforming on these expectations can harm their repu-
tation (Francis et al., 2008; Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Classification shifting is a method
of earnings management that is difficult to detect as the classification of some expenses
can be subjective due to the flexibility afforded by accounting standards, which may limit
auditors’ and regulators’ ability to challenge the management’s classification (Alfonso
et al., 2015; Athanasakou et al., 2009; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). Furthermore, classification
shifting does not change the total amount of expenses and income, and because of this it
attracts less auditor and public scrutiny (e.g. Athanasakou et al., 2009; McVay, 2006).
These characteristics of classification shifting are important in the context of social con-
nections given that social capital theory suggests well-connected CEOs are likely to avoid
misbehaviours that could be easily detected and lead to reputational losses (Lin, 2001).
In summary, the above arguments suggest that CEOs with large social connections
have incentives to inflate earnings. At the same time, they suggest that well-connected
CEOs should not engage in misbehaviours that may undermine their reputation. For
these reasons, we expect that classification shifting should be an attractive earnings man-
agement method for well-connected CEOs. Despite the possibility that it may negatively
affect future operating performance, this form of malpractice does not affect the future
bottom-line profit and is difficult to detect; it thereby helps such CEOs to inflate earnings
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to meet current-year market expectations without harming their reputation. We there-
fore make our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The use of classification shifting increases with CEO social connections.
In addition to investigating the overall effect of CEO social connections on
classification shifting, we examine two conditional effects: CEO locality and CEO
tenure. First, we investigate the effect of CEO locality on the predicted positive
relationship between CEO social connections and classification shifting as discussed
in Hypothesis 1. The locality of CEOs affects the strength of their social network as
stronger networks exist close to individuals’ home places (Relph, 1976; Yonker,
2017). As such, the pressure that the social network exerts on managerial decisions
is likely to be greater for local than foreign CEOs (Lai et al., 2020). Thus, under the
rent-extraction perspective, one can expect local well-connected CEOs to be under
greater pressure to meet market expectations when compared to foreign well-con-
nected CEOs and, as such, to have a greater incentive to manage earnings. Local
well-connected CEOs have a greater incentive to perform well: they are under
greater pressure to satisfy market expectations as a result of being well-connected,
and, being local, they are also under greater pressure to perform well in the local
context where maintaining a good reputation is fundamental (Relph, 1976). Therefore,
to the extent that the locality of CEOs influences their incentives to inflate earnings to
show that they are better performers, it is reasonable to expect that the effect of CEO
social connections on classification shifting is more pronounced among CEOs who are
local. This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: The use of classification shifting increases with CEO social connections when CEOs are
local.
Finally, we examine the effect of CEO tenure on the predicted positive association
between CEO social connections and classification shifting as discussed in Hypothesis
1. Prior research shows that CEOs’ incentive to manage earnings is greater in the
early, rather than in the late, years of their service in the company (Ali & Zhang,
2015; Hazarika et al., 2012). During the early years of CEOs’ service, the market is
uncertain about their ability to manage the business and uses the earnings reported
at that time in order to assess their ability (e.g. Fama, 1980; Holmström, 1999).
This provides CEOs with a greater incentive to inflate earnings in the early years
of their service to favourably influence perceptions of their ability (Ali & Zhang,
2015). Under a rent-extraction perspective, one can argue that well-connected CEOs
who are also in the early years of their service in a firm have a greater incentive to
manage earnings upwards when compared to well-connected CEOs who have been
serving a firm for longer time. Well-connected CEOs with a short tenure have a
greater incentive to inflate earnings: they are under greater pressure to satisfy
market expectations as a result of being well-connected, and they also need to
prove their ability as managers in the business as a result of being in the
early years of their service. Based on this discussion, it is reasonable to expect that
the effect of CEO social connections on classification shifting is stronger
among CEOs who are in the early years of their service. This leads to our final
hypothesis:
6 K. MALIKOV AND S. GAIA
H3: The use of classification shifting increases with CEO social connections when CEOs are
in the early years of their service.
3. Research design and data
3.1. Measuring unexpected core earnings
Classification shifting is tested by examining the association between unexpected core
earnings and income-decreasing special items (McVay, 2006).1 If firms employ classifi-
cation shifting, then unexpected core earnings in year t should increase with special
items in year t. To measure unexpected core earnings, expected levels of such earnings
need to be estimated. Following McVay (2006), we measure expected core earnings as
follows:
CEi,t = b0 + b1CEi,t−1 + b2ATOi,t + b3ACCRUALSi,t−1 + b4ACCRUALSi,t
+ b5GROWTHi,t + b6NEG GROWTHi,t + 1i,t
(1)
where CE is core earnings, calculated as sales minus cost of goods sold minus selling,
general, and administrative expenses divided by sales; ATO is asset turnover ratio, calcu-
lated as sales divided by average net operating assets, where the latter is calculated as the
difference between operating assets and operating liabilities; ACCRUALS is total accruals,
calculated as the difference between income before extraordinary items and cash flows
from operations divided by sales; GROWTH is the percentage change in sales; NEG_-
GROWTH is the percentage change in sales if the latter is negative, and zero otherwise.
We estimate the model cross-sectionally for each industry-year. Unexpected core earn-
ings are defined as the difference between reported and expected core earnings where
the latter are estimated using the coefficients from the model.
3.2. Measuring CEO social connections
CEO social connections are measured as the number of the CEO’s external connec-
tions with other executives and directors following Bhandari et al. (2018), Engelberg
et al. (2013), and Griffin et al. (2021). We define CEOs’ connections by examining
their employment ties as it appears that connections formed in professional environ-
ments have more impact on firms’ financial reporting quality than other types of con-
nections, such as the education or other social connections that occur through, for
example, military service and civic institutions (e.g. Bhandari et al., 2018).2 Employ-
ment connections occur when the CEO and another executive or director worked at
the same company during or prior to the current year. We exclude the CEO’s connec-
tions in the firm in which he or she is currently employed. CEOs’ employment con-
nections are measured by using their past and current employment history in public
and private firms.
1Income-decreasing special items capture the major types of non-recurring expenses including operating exceptional
ones.
2In the form of a robustness check, we examine the effect of CEOs’ education connections and other social ties on classifi-
cation shifting. The results show that these types of connections do not affect expense misclassification and thereby




To examine the effect of classification shifting on CEO social connections (Hypothesis 1),
we use the following regression equation:
UE CEi,t = a0 + a1SIi,t + a2LCEO NETi,t + a3SIi,t × LCEO NETi,t
+ a4LCEO AGEi,t + a5CEO LOCALi,t + a6CEO ETENi,t
+ a7BIG4i,t + a8B INDEPi,t + a9B TENi,t + a10B OUTi,t + a11REMi,t
+ a12AEMi,t + a13LEVi,t + a14GROWTHi,t + a15SIZEi,t + a16ROAi,t
+ Year Fixed Effects+ Industry Fixed Effect + 1i,t
(2)
In the regression model, UE_CE is unexpected core earnings. SI is income-decreasing
special items scaled by sales, multiplied by negative one. The regression of UE_CE on SI
provides the basis for examining the misclassification of expense items. LCEO_NET is
our test variable, which is measured as the logarithm of the number of CEO employment
connections.3 The interaction of SI with LCEO_NET indicates the effect of CEO social
connections on classification shifting. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the coefficient of the
interaction term SI × LCEO_NET will be positive and significant in the regression
model (2).
The model includes several corporate governance- and firm characteristics-related
control variables. We control for CEO age (LCEO_AGE), CEO locality (CEO_LOCAL),
and CEOs’ early years of service (CEO_ETEN) as CEO connectedness and the use of
classification shifting may be correlated with these CEO characteristics (Ali & Zhang,
2015; Hazarika et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2020). Haw et al. (2011) document that the use of
classification shifting decreases with the presence of Big-4 auditors. Therefore, we
control for this external monitoring by adding an indicator variable, BIG4, which is
equal to one if the firm hires a Big-4 auditing firm, and zero otherwise. We also
control for board independence (B_INDEP), average tenure of independent directors
on the board (B_TEN), and average number of outside directorships held by indepen-
dent directors (B_OUT) since Zalata and Roberts (2016) find that these corporate gov-
ernance variables affect companies’ expense misclassification practices. In addition,
firms’ real (REM) and accrual earnings management (AEM) practices are controlled
for to ensure that our results are incremental to the ability of these earnings manipu-
lation methods to explain expense shifting. Fan et al. (2010) document that firms
employ classification shifting and accrual earnings management as substitutes, while
Fan and Liu (2017) find some evidence that firms use real activities manipulation
and expense misclassification simultaneously. Furthermore, we include leverage
(LEV), sales growth ratio (GROWTH), firm size (SIZE), and return-on-assets (ROA)
to control for profitability and scale effects (Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020; Zalata &
Roberts, 2016). Lastly, year and industry fixed effects are included to control for
timing and industry effects, respectively. Complete variable definitions are given in
Appendix A.
3Our main results remain unchanged if, instead of the log transformation, we use the actual number of CEO social
connections.
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To test whether the use of classification shifting increases with CEO social connec-
tions when CEOs are local (Hypothesis 2), we expand model (2) by interacting special









Hypothesis 2 predicts that the coefficient of the interaction term SI ×LCEO_NET ×
CEO_LOCAL will be positive and significant in the regression model (3).
Finally, to test whether the use of classification shifting increases with CEO social con-
nections when they are in the early years of their service (Hypothesis 3), we expand
model (2) by interacting special items (SI) and CEO social connections (LCEO_NET)








Hypothesis 3 predicts that the coefficient of the interaction term SI ×LCEO_NET ×
CEO_ETEN will be positive and significant in the regression model (4).
3.4. Data and sample
We start the sample selection process with all the UK listed firms obtained from Com-
pustat Global for the period between 2005 and 2016.5 Our sample period begins in 2005
because UK public firms were required to follow IFRS from 2005.6 Following prior
studies, we exclude financial firms since they have a different financial reporting
environment. We require, following Athanasakou et al. (2009), at least six observations
per industry (two-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes) year to ensure that
there are sufficient data for the estimation of expected core earnings. This yields an
4We define early years as those firm-years that correspond to the first three years of CEOs’ service, following Ali and Zhang
(2015). Thus, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service, and zero otherwise. Our
results do not change if we use the median of CEO tenure as the cutoff to define CEOs who are in the early vs. later years
of their service.
5Dead firms along with alive ones are included across the test period to avoid survivorship bias.
6UK firms listed on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) were required to follow IFRS from 2007 (Ali et al., 2016;
Bouwman, 2011; Goergen et al., 2019). Thus, the sample period begins in 2007 for these firms.
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initial sample of 10,316 firm-year observations, comprising 1,670 firms. We then merge
this sample with the BoardEx database, which provides CEO connections7 and corpor-
ate governance data. This results in a final sample of 5,391 firm-year observations, com-
prising 995 firms.
Table 1 indicates the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main regression
analysis. The mean (median) of CEO social connections (CEO_NET) is 32.83 (23). This
indicates that the average (median) CEO in our sample has 33 (23) connections. Unex-
pected core earnings (UE_CE) have a mean (median) of 0.014 (0.000), and income-
decreasing special items (SI) have a mean (median) of 0.044 (0.000). These results
suggest that firms have, on average, positive unexpected core earnings and that special
items are, on average, 4.4 percent of annual sales. The mean values of real (REM) and
accruals (AEM) earnings management are −0.015 and −0.003, respectively. We
observe that 84 percent of the firms in the sample are run by local CEOs (CEO_LOCAL).
Around 41 percent of the CEOs in our sample are in the early years of their service
(CEO_ETEN). About 69 percent of the sample firms are audited by a Big-4 auditing
firm (BIG4), and nearly half of the board members (48 percent) are independent direc-
tors (B_INDEP). The sample has average leverage (LEV) and sales growth ratios
(GROWTH) of around 17 percent, and a mean ratio of return on assets (ROA) of 7
percent. Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in the
main regression analysis. Overall, the correlation statistics do not indicate the existence
of any potentially serious multicollinearity issue.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables N Mean 25th Median 75th S.D
UE_CE 5,391 0.014 −0.069 0.000 0.051 0.726
SI 5,391 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.163
CEO_NET 5,391 32.830 14.000 23.000 40.000 29.538
CEO_AGE 5,391 51.129 46.000 51.000 56.000 6.814
CEO_LOCAL 5,391 0.841 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.365
CEO_ETEN 5,391 0.414 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.493
BIG4 5,391 0.693 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.461
B_INDEP 5,391 0.477 0.375 0.500 0.600 0.157
B_TEN 5,391 3.558 2.000 3.167 4.600 2.274
B_OUT 5,391 2.046 1.333 2.000 2.500 0.868
REM 5,391 −0.015 −0.223 0.013 0.218 0.417
AEM 5,391 −0.003 −0.039 −0.004 0.032 0.084
LEV 5,391 0.168 0.013 0.139 0.263 0.163
GROWTH 5,391 0.162 −0.030 0.066 0.203 0.570
SIZE 5,391 4.735 3.153 4.783 6.432 2.429
ROA 5,391 0.067 0.049 0.102 0.156 0.189
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of the main variables used in the study. UE_CE is unexpected core earn-
ings, SI is income-decreasing special items as a percentage of sales, multiplied by negative 1, CEO_NET is the number of
CEO employment connections, CEO_AGE is the CEO’s age, CEO_LOCAL is equal to one if the CEO is local and zero other-
wise, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal to
one if the firm is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise, B_INDEP is board independence, B_TEN is the
average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the average number of outside directorships held
by independent directors, REM is the measure of real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings
management, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size, and ROA is return-on-assets.
7BoardEx provides information on individual networks through employment, other activities, and education. In our analy-
sis, we considered only external networks with executives and directors, as explained in subsection 3.2.
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Table 2. Pearson correlations.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) UE_CE 1.000
(2) SI 0.107 1.000
(3) LCEO_NET 0.031 0.040 1.000
(4) LCEO_AGE 0.023 −0.010 0.181 1.000
(5) CEO_LOCAL −0.004 −0.013 −0.043 −0.050 1.000
(6) CEO_ETEN 0.014 0.088 −0.073 −0.184 −0.057 1.000
(7) BIG4 0.012 −0.069 0.291 0.055 −0.045 −0.051 1.000
(8) B_INDEP 0.024 0.022 0.279 0.070 −0.133 −0.025 0.318 1.000
(9) B_TEN 0.001 −0.067 −0.076 0.097 0.033 −0.234 −0.058 −0.036 1.000
(10) B_OUT 0.005 −0.000 0.099 −0.007 −0.047 0.040 0.133 0.168 −0.075 1.000
(11) REM 0.027 0.066 0.035 0.015 −0.001 0.018 0.021 0.036 −0.061 0.009 1.000
(12) AEM −0.066 −0.016 −0.016 0.007 −0.001 0.022 −0.022 −0.024 −0.039 −0.018 0.087 1.000
(13) LEV 0.014 0.023 0.198 0.022 −0.073 0.054 0.168 0.150 −0.067 0.075 0.072 0.024 1.000
(14) GROWTH −0.051 0.017 −0.039 −0.086 −0.018 0.037 −0.065 −0.059 −0.089 0.019 −0.056 0.124 −0.071 1.000
(15) SIZE 0.028 −0.182 0.464 0.118 −0.113 −0.038 0.519 0.420 −0.016 0.211 0.049 −0.036 0.339 −0.137 1.000
(16) ROA 0.012 −0.219 0.124 0.046 0.026 −0.100 0.263 0.129 0.115 0.099 −0.148 −0.038 0.106 −0.099 0.558 1.000
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlations among regression variables for the full sample. UE_CE is unexpected core earnings, SI is income-decreasing special items as a percentage of
sales, multiplied by negative 1, LCEO_NET is the log of the number of CEO employment connections, LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age, CEO_LOCAL is equal to one if the CEO is local and
zero otherwise, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero
otherwise, B_INDEP is board independence, B_TEN is the average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the average number of outside directorships held by independent
directors, REM is the measure of real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings management, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size, and ROA
is return-on-assets.















The results from regression (2), employed to test whether the use of classification shifting
increases with CEO social connections (Hypothesis 1), are shown in Table 3. The table
indicates that there is a significantly positive relationship between unexpected core




































Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
N 5,391
R-squared 0.024
Notes: This table shows regression results for examining the effect of CEO social connec-
tions on classification shifting. UE_CE is unexpected core earnings, SI is income-decreas-
ing special items as a percentage of sales, multiplied by negative 1, LCEO_NET is the log
of the number of CEO employment connections, LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age,
CEO_LOCAL is equal to one if the CEO is local and zero otherwise, CEO_ETEN is equal to
one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal
to one if the firm is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise, B_INDEP is board
independence, B_TEN is the average tenure of independent directors on the board,
B_OUT is the average number of outside directorships held by independent directors,
REM is the measure of real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earn-
ings management, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size,
and ROA is return-on-assets.
Reported values are the coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses.*, **, and *** represent
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two tailed).
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earnings (UE_CE) and the interaction variable SI × LCEO_NET at the 1 percent signifi-
cance level. This suggests that CEOs with a larger number of employment connections
shift more core expenses to income-decreasing special items to inflate core earnings com-
pared to CEOs with a smaller number of employment connections. The coefficient of SI is
0.470 for CEOs with the lowest number of employment connections and 0.967 (0.470 +
0.497) for CEOs with the largest number of employment connections. The results, there-
fore, provide evidence that the misclassification of expense items within income state-
ment increases with CEOs’ employment-related social connections, in line with
Hypothesis 1.
The findings from regression (3), used to test whether CEO locality affects the
relationship between classification shifting and CEO social connections (Hypothesis
2), are reported in Table 4. As shown, the relationship between unexpected core earnings
(UE_CE) and the interaction variable SI × LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL is significantly
positive at the 1 percent significance level. This result provides evidence that the mis-
classification of expense items significantly increases with CEOs’ employment-related
social connections when CEOs are local, which support Hypothesis 2.
Finally, the results from regression (4), employed to test whether CEOs’ early years of
service affect the relationship between classification shifting and CEO social connections
(Hypothesis 3), are presented in Table 5. The table shows that the association between
unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) and the interaction variable SI × LCEO_NET ×
CEO_ETEN is significantly positive at the 5 percent significance level. This result pro-
vides evidence that misclassifying core expenses as income-decreasing special items sig-
nificantly increases with CEOs’ employment-related social connections when they are in
the early years of their service, providing support for Hypothesis 3.
Overall, the results reported in Tables 3–5 support our hypotheses. They
suggest that CEOs with a larger number of connections shift core expenses to
income-decreasing special items to a greater extent to inflate core earnings and that




There may be some unobservable factors that affect both the use of classification shift-
ing and CEO social connections that have been omitted from our main analysis. This
possibility might make CEO social connections an endogenous variable in our analysis.
To address this concern, we use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. At the first
stage, we regress CEO employment connections (LCEO_NET) on the industry average
CEO employment connections (IND_NET) and all the explanatory variables in our
main analysis where the former is used as an instrumental variable for CEO social
ties (Ferris et al., 2017; Griffin et al., 2021). The results are shown in column 1 of
Table 6 and suggest that our instrumental variable, IND_NET, significantly affects
CEO employment connections. At the second stage, we estimate our main models
using predicted CEO employment connections (PR_LCEO_NET) as the regressor
obtained from the first stage model. The results are presented in Table 6, columns 2
to 4. Column 2 shows that there is a significantly positive relationship between
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SI × LCEO_NET −0.795
(−1.582)
SI × CEO_LOCAL −0.057
(−0.330)
LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL 0.019
(0.234)






























Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
N 5,391
R-squared 0.026
Notes: This table shows regression results for examining the effect of CEO locality on the
association between CEO social connections and classification shifting. UE_CE is unex-
pected core earnings, SI is income-decreasing special items as a percentage of sales, mul-
tiplied by negative 1, LCEO_NET is the log of the number of CEO employment
connections, CEO_LOCAL is equal to one if the CEO is local and zero otherwise,
LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the
first three years of his/her service and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal to one if the firm
is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise, B_INDEP is board independence,
B_TEN is the average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the average
number of outside directorships held by independent directors, REM is the measure of
real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings management, LEV
is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size, and ROA is return-on-
assets.
Reported values are the coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two tailed).
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SI × LCEO_NET −0.247
(−0.621)
SI × CEO_ETEN −0.191
(−1.445)
LCEO_NET × CEO_ETEN −0.037
(−0.582)






























Year Fixed Effects Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes
N 5,391
R-squared 0.025
Notes: This table shows regression results for examining the effect of CEO tenure on the
association between CEO social connections and classification shifting. UE_CE is unex-
pected core earnings, SI is income-decreasing special items as a percentage of sales, mul-
tiplied by negative 1, LCEO_NET is the log of the number of CEO employment
connections, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her
service and zero otherwise, LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age, CEO_LOCAL is equal
to one if the CEO is local and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal to one if the firm is
audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise, B_INDEP is board independence,
B_TEN is the average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the
average number of outside directorships held by independent directors, REM is the
measure of real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings manage-
ment, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size, and ROA is
return-on-assets.
Reported values are the coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two tailed).
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Table 6. Controlling for endogeneity.
1st stage 2nd stage























SI × CEO_LOCAL −0.153
(−0.845)
PR_LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL −0.063
(−0.422)
SI × PR_LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL 2.137**
(2.420)
SI × CEO_ETEN −0.225*
(−1.726)
PR_LCEO_NET × CEO_ETEN −0.153
(−1.297)


















































































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,391 5,391 5,391 5,391
R-squared 0.310 0.025 0.026 0.027
Notes: This table presents regression results for our main analysis after dealing with endogeneity using a two-stage least
squares method. LCEO_NET is the log of the number of CEO employment connections, IND_NET is the log of the indus-
try average CEO employment connections, UE_CE is unexpected core earnings, SI is income-decreasing special items as
a percentage of sales, multiplied by negative 1, PR_LCEO_NET is the predicted value of CEO employment connections
from the first stage estimation, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service and zero
otherwise, LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age, CEO_LOCAL is equal to one if the CEO is local and zero otherwise, BIG4
is equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise, B_INDEP is board independence, B_TEN
is the average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the average number of outside directorships held
by independent directors, REM is the measure of real earnings management, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings
management, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is firm size, and ROA is return-on-assets.
Reported values are the coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01, respectively (two tailed).
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unexpected core earnings (UE_CE) and the interaction variable SI × PR_LCEO_NET.
This supports our main result; namely, that CEOs with larger employment connections
engage in more expense misclassification. Column 3 shows that the coefficient on SI ×
PR_LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL is significantly positive, and column 4 indicates that
the coefficient on SI × PR_LCEO_NET × CEO_ETEN is significantly positive,
suggesting that the use of classification shifting increases with CEOs’ employment-
related social connections when CEOs are local and when they are in the early
years of their service, respectively. Overall, these results are very similar to those pro-
vided in the main analysis.
4.2.2. Earnings benchmarks
Our main analysis shows that the use of classification shifting significantly increases with
an increase in CEO social connections. This analysis considers all the UK companies in
our sample. However, not all these firms have an incentive to engage in classification
shifting; previous studies have documented that this form of earnings management is
used more by companies that need to meet/beat earnings benchmarks (Athanasakou
et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010; McVay, 2006; Zalata & Roberts, 2017). For example, Atha-
nasakou et al. (2009), using a sample of UK firms, show that firms that just meet/beat
analyst forecasts are more likely to employ expense misclassification. Zalata and
Roberts (2017), using a sample of UK firms, find that firms that just meet/beat last
year’s core earnings engage in classification shifting. They do not find similar evidence
for firms that just meet/beat zero core earnings. For robustness purposes, we examine
whether our main results hold when we estimate our main regression models considering
only firms where CEOs have incentives to employ classification shifting. These firms are
defined, following the UK-based findings reported above, as the ones that just meet/beat
analyst forecasts or last year’s core earnings. We define firms as just meeting/beating
analyst forecasts if they report an earnings forecast error from £0.00 to £0.01 (Fan
et al., 2010; Haw et al., 2011).8 For the last year’s core earnings benchmark, firms are con-
sidered as just meeting/beating if they report a change in reported core earnings per share
between £0.00 and £0.01 (Fan & Liu, 2017).
The results are given in Table 7. Column 1 indicates that the coefficient on SI
× LCEO_NET is significantly positive, supporting our main result that CEOs with larger
employment connections use more classification shifting. Columns 2 and 3 show that the
coefficients on SI × LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL and SI × LCEO_NET × CEO_ETEN
are significantly positive, implying that the use of expense shifting increases with CEOs’
employment connections when CEOs are local and when they are in the early years of
their service, respectively. Overall, these findings suggest that our results hold when the
instances in which CEOs have incentives to engage in classification shifting are examined.
4.2.3. Other robustness tests
In order to demonstrate the robustness of our results, we conduct a series of robustness
tests. First, we consider the concern that BoardEx may not provide complete information
8Forecast errors are calculated as the difference between actual earnings per share and forecast median earnings per
share (e.g., Haw et al., 2011).
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Table 7. CEO social connections and classification shifting: Earnings benchmarks.
(1) (2) (3)



















SI × CEO_LOCAL −0.630**
(−2.361)
LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL −0.060
(−0.504)
SI × LCEO_NET × CEO_LOCAL 2.705***
(3.296)
SI × CEO_ETEN −0.616***
(−2.766)
LCEO_NET × CEO_ETEN −0.185**
(−2.016)






















































































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 2,144 2,144 2,144
R−squared 0.029 0.035 0.038
Notes: This table shows our main regression results for a sample of firms that just meet/beat earnings benchmarks. UE_CE
is unexpected core earnings, SI is income-decreasing special items as a percentage of sales, multiplied by negative 1,
LCEO_NET is the log of the number of CEO employment connections, LCEO_AGE is the log of the CEO’s age, CEO_LOCAL
is equal to one if the CEO is local and zero otherwise, CEO_ETEN is equal to one if the CEO is in the first three years of his/
her service and zero otherwise, BIG4 is equal to one if the firm is audited by a Big-4 auditing firm and zero otherwise,
B_INDEP is board independence, B_TEN is the average tenure of independent directors on the board, B_OUT is the
average number of outside directorships held by independent directors, REM is the measure of real earnings manage-
ment, AEM is the measure of accruals earnings management, LEV is leverage ratio, GROWTH is sales growth ratio, SIZE is
firm size, and ROA is return-on-assets.
Reported values are the coefficients, with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two tailed).
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about CEOs’ employment history in private firms. We thus use an alternative specifica-
tion and measure CEOs’ employment ties by considering their employment history only
in public firms. We find that the results are robust to this alternative measure of CEOs’
employment connections. We also consider the possibility that including CEOs’ current
directorships in the social connections measure may drive our main results. To check the
robustness of the results, we measure CEOs’ employment connections based on only
their past employment history. The results are robust to this alternative specification.
Second, we use an alternative sample to check the validity of our results. Given that we
focus on all UK listed firms, our sample firms are quoted either on the main stock
exchange or on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Firms listed on the main
market are larger, more visible, and subject to greater public scrutiny than AIM firms
(Abdo et al., 2018). Furthermore, their CEOs are likely to have more social connections
compared to CEOs of firms quoted on the latter9 and to be more concerned about their
reputational capital. Therefore, one should expect to find that our primary analysis holds
if we use firms listed only on the main stock exchange. We test this expectation and find
that our results hold when using the alternative sample of firms.
Third, we consider the possibility that the association between CEO social connections
and classification shifting may not be due only to arguments relating to insignificant repu-
tational losses arising from shifting. By contrast, the association might also be due to an
imitation effect, meaning that well-connected CEOs use classification shifting because
the same technique has been adopted in their social network. To examine this issue, in
the spirit of Griffin et al. (2021), we add to our main analysis the average levels of unex-
pected core earnings (A_C_UE_CE), special items (A_C_SI), and their interactions over
the prior three-years by other firms in the CEO’s social network. We find that the coeffi-
cient on the interaction between A_C_UE_CE and A_C_SI is insignificant, suggesting that
the use of expense misclassification in the firm managed by the CEO might not be associ-
ated with the use of this practice by other firms in the CEO’s social network.10More impor-
tantly, we continue to find a significant and positive association between classification
shifting and CEO social connections. Taken together, these results suggest that well-con-
nected CEOs may employ classification shifting mainly for the reason that this form of
earnings management is not likely to cause significant reputational losses.
Fourth, we consider the possibility that CEO compensation may affect our main results
as it could affect the incentive for CEOs to engage in classification shifting. To check for
this, we add CEO total compensation and CEO equity-based compensation variables to
the main analysis. We find that the inclusion of these controls appears to make no differ-
ence to our main findings. In addition, we consider the possibility that including control
variables only as main effects may not fully capture the impacts of controls on classification
shifting for the reason that our hypotheses rely on the interaction between CEO social con-
nections and income-decreasing special items (Fan et al., 2019). To address this concern,
we also include the interactions of our control variables with income-decreasing special
items in our main model. We find that the main results continue to hold.
9In our sample, we find that CEOs employed by firms quoted on the main stock exchange have on average 38 social
connections, while those employed by firms listed on the AIM have on average 23 ties.
10This result should be interpreted cautiously as it is based on 955 firm-year observations, which account for only 18
percent of our sample firm-year observations. The significant reduction in the sample size is due to data unavailability
with regard to calculating classification shifting variables for other firms in the CEO’s social network.
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As a last robustness check, we examine whether the results are sensitive to an alterna-
tive methodology of testing classification shifting. To do so, we follow Athanasakou et al.
(2011) and classify firms as classification shifters (CS=1) if their unexpected core earnings
are positive and non-recurring items are negative. We then use a logit model of the prob-
ability that a firm is a classification shifter based on CEO social connections. The results
show that our conclusions still hold for this alternative measure of classification shifting.
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this study, we examine the impact of CEO social connections on classification shifting,
a malpractice that misleads accounting information users about the core performance of
a firm by altering the presentation of different elements within the income statement
without changing the net income. To investigate our research question, we use a
sample of 995 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange in the period 2005–2016,
with a total of 5,391 firm-year observations. Our results show that firms whose CEOs
have a larger number of social connections are more likely to engage in classification
shifting. This result confirms the presence of a “dark side” of social connections
(Carrera et al., 2017; Griffin et al., 2021; Johnson et al., 2013), which emerges when a
wrongful act does not have reputational consequences. Our results also show that
well-connected CEOs are likely to engage in classification shifting more when they are
more concerned about reputational consequences (as local CEOs) and have greater
incentives to manage earnings (as CEOs in the early years of their service).
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we extend the growing
literature on classification shifting (e.g. Athanasakou et al., 2009; Boahen & Mamatzakis,
2020; Fan et al., 2010; Haw et al., 2011; McVay, 2006; Zalata & Roberts, 2017) by being
the first to provide evidence that the social capital of the CEO matters to a firm’s classifi-
cation shifting outcomes. Prior studies in this literature show that equity market incentives
(Athanasakou et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2010; Haw et al., 2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2017), board
characteristics (Zalata & Roberts, 2016), debt market incentives (Fan et al., 2019; Malikov
et al., 2019), and religious social norms (Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020) affect firms’ classifi-
cation shifting. In this study, we focus on the social capital of the CEO and show that this is
a key factor that drives the widespread malpractice of classification shifting.
Second, we extend the emerging literature in accounting that has investigated the role
of CEO social connections in shaping firms’ reporting policies (e.g. Bhandari et al., 2018;
Griffin et al., 2021) by exploring the effect of social connections on classification shifting,
a previously unexplored malpractice in this context. Griffin et al. (2021) find that CEO
social connections promote real earnings management, while Bhandari et al. (2018)
show that they reduce accrual earnings management. These contrasting findings raise
the important question of how CEO social capital shapes firms’ reporting policy in
terms of the classification of income statement line items. We investigate this research
question and show that employing well-connected CEOs results in more misclassification
of core expenses as income-decreasing special items.
Furthermore, we believe that our results can help to reconcile the aforementioned
contrasting findings of Bhandari et al. (2018) and Griffin et al. (2021) by considering
the different reputational harm that classification shifting and real earnings management
practices produce in comparison to accrual earnings management. Reputation is pivotal
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in social networks (Lin, 2001). Networks impose social norms on their members, which
can cause important reputational losses in cases of misbehaviour (Spagnolo, 1999).
Classification shifting and real earnings management are likely to cause less reputational
harm than accrual earnings management because they are more difficult to detect (Atha-
nasakou et al., 2009; Boahen & Mamatzakis, 2020; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). As such,
they are appealing to well-connected CEOs for whom meeting earnings targets is very
important as market and financial analysts are likely to pressure them more than less-
connected CEOs (Malmendier & Tate, 2009). Classification shifting can help them to
meet earnings targets without incurring a high risk of reputational losses.
Last but not least, this study contributes to the more general literature on social capital.
First, it shows that the “dark side”of social capital (e.g. Carrera et al., 2017;Griffin et al., 2021;
Johnson et al., 2013) is likely to emerge in instances when misconduct is harmless for indi-
viduals’ reputation. Second, it provides evidence of the moderating role played by CEO
tenure in the relationship betweenCEO social connections and the use of classification shift-
ing.Our results add to those ofAli andZhang (2015) by demonstrating thatCEOswho are in
the early years of their service manage earnings to a greater extent, particularly when they
have a larger number of social connections. Third, it extends Lai et al. (2020), according
towhich localCEOs aremore likely than foreignCEOs to consider local reputation concerns
in theirmanagerial actions, by showing that local CEOswith a larger number of connections
engage more in corporate malpractices that are unlikely to damage their reputation.
As is the case for other studies, we acknowledge that our study is subject to several
limitations, which in turn open up new avenues for future research. First, we have
chosen to focus on CEO social connections, rather than on CFO social connections.
Despite the fact that CEOs are not directly involved in overseeing the preparation of
financial statements, they are the most powerful actors in an organisation (Daily &
Johnson, 1997), have been found to influence CFOs’ accounting choices, and have the
ultimate say on decisions related to financial reporting (Bishop et al., 2017; Feng et al.,
2011). Moreover, this choice allows us to better relate the results of our study to those
of Bhandari et al. (2018) and Griffin et al. (2021) on accrual/real earnings management,
as both studies analysed CEO social connections. We, however, acknowledge that it could
also be interesting to examine how CFO social capital affects classification shifting, and
we leave the examination of this to future research. Second, even though we used a two-
stage least squares method to deal with potential endogeneity issues, we acknowledge that
we cannot completely rule out the endogeneity problem, which remains one of the limit-
ations of this study. Further, due to data unavailability we could not provide a more
extensive analysis related to the possibility that the association between CEO social con-
nections and classification shifting is not only explained by arguments relating to
insignificant reputational losses arising from shifting, but also to an imitation effect of
malpractices propagated via social networks. Future studies might investigate this issue
by focusing on an institutional setting that has more data availability.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions
CEO Social Connections and Classification Shifting Variables
LCEO_NET = The log of the number of CEO’s external employment connections. Employment connections
occur when the CEO and another executive or director worked at the same company during or
prior to the current year.
ACCRUALS = Net income before extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations, scaled by sales.
ATO = Sales divided by average net operating assets where the latter is calculated as the difference
between operating assets and operating liabilities.
CE = Sales minus cost of goods sold minus selling, general, and administrative expenses, scaled by
sales.
GROWTH = The change in sales scaled by sales in year t−1.
NEG_ GROWTH = Percentage change in sales if the latter is negative, and 0 otherwise.
SI = Special items multiplied by negative one scaled by sales when special items are income-
decreasing, and zero otherwise.
UE_CE = The difference between actual and expected core earnings where the latter are measured using
the McVay (2006) model.
Other variables
LCEO_AGE = The log of the CEO’s age.
CEO_ETEN = 1 if the CEO is in the first three years of his/her service, and zero otherwise.
CEO_LOCAL = 1 if the CEO is local, and zero otherwise.
BIG4 = 1 if the firm is audited by a Big Four audit firm, and 0 otherwise.
B_INDEP = The number of independent directors on the board divided by the total number of directors on the
board.
B_TEN = The average tenure of independent directors on the board.
B_OUT = The average number of outside directorships held by board independent directors.
REM = The sum of three real earnings management measures: abnormal levels of cash flows from
operations, abnormal levels of production costs and abnormal levels of discretionary expenses.
These real earnings management proxies are measured using the Roychowdhury (2006) models.
AEM = The difference between actual and normal levels of accruals where the latter are measured using
the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995). This model is estimated by adding return-on-
assets as an additional regressor to control for extreme cases of operating performance (Kothari
et al., 2005).
LEV = The ratio of total debt to total assets.
SIZE = The log of sales.
ROA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total assets.
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